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THE NEW BREED OF PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM:
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AFTER 28 U.S.C. § 1367
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties must plead compulsive counterclaims, which arise out of the same
transaction as the subject matter of the suit, in the answer. This rule reflects the
necessity of determining the rights of the parties and rendering the matter res
judicata to avoid future litigation. By contrast, permissive counterclaims arise
outside of the same transaction as the subject matter of the suit and are not
precluded under res judicata from determination in a separate suit. Although the
United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, federal courts have
traditionally held that an independent basis of jurisdiction must exist before a
federal court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive
counterclaim.' This requirement, known as the independent basis doctrine,
potentially denies a defendant the opportunity to litigate a counterclaim against a
plaintiff when fairness and judicial efficiency would encourage its trial in the same
proceeding as plaintiffs original claim.
The Second Circuit's recent holding in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co.2
challenges the continuing validity of the independent basis doctrine after the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367? In Jones, the plaintiffs purchased vehicles using
the defendant's financing plan.4 Plaintiffs suit under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act alleged defendant's subjective mark-up policy penalized African-American
customers with higher than customary interest rates.5 Defendant denied the
discrimination claim and asserted state law counterclaims against three of the car
buyers for the delinquent amounts of their loans.6 The district court granted
plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds that they were
permissive and lacked an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.7 The district
court noted that the Second Circuit had not yet decided whether § 1367 "alters the
standards regardingjurisdiction over counterclaims."8 The court added that "[e]ven
if the counterclaims fall within the outer boundary of the court's jurisdiction under
1. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Elec. Signaling Co., 206 F. 295, 298 (E.D.N.Y.
1913). See, e.g., Peter Farrell Supercars, Inc. v. Monsen, 82 Fed. Appx. 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2003)
(retaining jurisdiction over state law supplemental claims even though the federal claim was dismissed
before trial); Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming
dismissal of defendant's counterclaim because it was permissive and without an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction); Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1 st Cir. 1998) (using the logical
relation test to hold the counterclaim was permissive and thus not within the court's supplemental
jurisdiction); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing
counterclaim which had an "independent federal jurisdictional basis..
2. 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990) addresses supplemental jurisdiction. See infra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text.
4. Jones, 358 F.3d at 207.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 00-8830, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10902, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2002).
8. Id.
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§ 1367(a)," dismissal of the counterclaims under the discretionary power granted
to the court in § 1367(c) would be appropriate.9
The Second Circuit, vacating and remanding the district court's decision, held
that jurisdiction authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 extended to permissive
counterclaims despite the lack of independent jurisdiction."0 The Second Circuit
agreed with the lower court's determination that the counterclaims were permissive
since they did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence" as plaintiffs'
claims. 2 However, calling attention to the absence of explanation for the
independent jurisdiction doctrine in case law, the Second Circuit "conclude[d] that
the determination that a counterclaim is permissive within the meaning of [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 13 is not dispositive of the constitutional question whether
there is federal jurisdiction over the counterclaim."13
Under the judicially-created ancillary jurisdiction doctrine 4 prior to § 1367,
courts followed the view that the transaction or occurrence ancillary requirement
defined the constitutional limits of supplementaljurisdiction. In Jones, the Second
Circuit found that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 expanded supplemental
jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Article III "cases" or "controversies"
requirement.'" The court held that the relationship between plaintiffs' claims and
defendant's counterclaims satisfied the Gibbs' common nucleus of operative fact
standard,'6 although the relationship was not sufficient enough to make the
counterclaims compulsory. 7
From the Second Circuit's perspective, the enactment of § 1367 created a new
breed of permissive counterclaims-one which arises outside of the same
transaction or occurrence as a plaintiffs claim, yet falls within the bounds of an
Article III case or controversy and thus requires not independent basis. 8 Under this
view, the independent basis doctrine is applicable only to those permissive
counterclaims which fall outside of an Article III case or controversy.
The Second Circuit's progressive view upends the traditional independent basis
doctrine which applies to all permissive counterclaims, a doctrine which many
9. Id.
10. Jones, 358 F.3d at 213, 216.
11. Both the district court and the Second Circuit in Jones maintained a narrow definition of
transaction or occurrence. A broader definition of transaction or occurrence may result in labeling the
counterclaim as compulsive rather than permissive. For the purpose of this Comment, however, the
breadth of the definition of transaction or occurrence is not determinative. Section 1367 expanded
federal supplemental jurisdiction over any claim within the same "case or controversy" as plaintiffs
claim. As will be discussed infra, a "case or controversy" is necessarily broader than either the broad
or narrow definition of a transaction or occurrence.
12. Jones, 358 F.3d at 209.
13. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205,212 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ambromovage
v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984)).
14. See infra Part H.A.
15. Jones, 358 F.3d at 212. See also U.S. CONST. art. I discussed infra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text.
16. Most courts view Gibbs' "common nucleus" standard as the threshold constitutional
requirement of an Article III case or controversy for the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. See
infra note 44-50 and accompanying text.
17. Jones, 358 F.3d at 213.
18. Id.
[Vol. 56: 607
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss3/13
CIVIL PROCEDURE
jurisdictions, including the Fourth Circuit, 9 still follow.2" In doing so, however, the
Second Circuit leaves open the crucial question of what standard provides the outer
limit of an Article III case or controversy. The answer is significant to federal
practice and to ourjudicial system's perennial endeavor "to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."'"
In order to explore the ramifications of the Second Circuit's pragmatic view,
Part II of this Comment describes the history of the supplemental jurisdiction
doctrine and discusses the rationale behind the distinction between permissive and
compulsory counterclaims for jurisdictional purposes. Part III outlines the
criticisms of and inconsistencies in the treatment of permissive counterclaims. Part
IV examines cases, including several from the Fourth Circuit, that apply the
independent basis doctrine and argues that the Second Circuit's holding in Jones
better promotes trial efficiency, convenience, and economy by determining both the
claim and the counterclaim in one action. Part V considers the conflicting
definitions of an Article III case or controversy and suggests that the logical
relationship definition provides the most pragmatic and efficient standard under
§ 1367. Part VI concludes that federal courts should be able to exercise jurisdiction
to the extent provided by Congress and the Constitution.
II. HISTORY
A. History of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Doctrine
The ability of a federal court to hear state law claims in the same proceeding as
a claim over which the federal court has original jurisdiction is a subject fraught
with complexities and contradictions. Article Ill of the Constitution provides that
the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all cases [or controversies],
in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."22  This broad
jurisdictional grant gives federal courts the authority to hear all claims arising under
federal law. The more difficult issue is whether and when federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear state law claims that are joined with federal law claims.
First addressed in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,23 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the mere presence of state law claims within a case is not
19. See Harrison v. Grass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 (D. Md. 2004); Peter Farrell Supercars, Inc.
v. Monsen, 82 Fed. Appx. 293,298 (4th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Gala Indus., Inc., No. 95-1031 -R, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9893, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 7, 1996).
20. See Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209 F.3d 648,651 (7th Cir. 2000); Iglesias
v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922
F.2d 357,360 (7th Cir. 1990); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assoc., Inc. v. Arctic Express, Inc., 238
F. Supp. 2d 963, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Evans v. Am. Credit Sys., Inc., No. 8-02CV472, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22433, at *4 (D. Neb. Dec. 10, 2003); Mar. & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 16.66 Acres
of Land, 190 F.R.D. 15, 18 (D. Me. 1999); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Quantum
Chem. Corp., No. 91-6907, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12716, at *15 (D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1994); Tupperware
Home Parties v. Stewart, No. 92-2826, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6874, at *7-8 (D. La. May 6, 1993).
21. FED.R.Crv.P. 1.
22. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 2.
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
2005]
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sufficient to divest a federal court of jurisdiction.24 Further, when a case contains
a federal claim, Congress has the power to give federal courts jurisdiction over that
case "although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it."'2s The Court
held that federal courts have jurisdiction over state law claims only when they are
"submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law."26
This seemingly broad construction of jurisdictional power, however, is subject to
Article III's limitations and Congress' power to dictate the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts.27
In Wayman v. Southard," the Court indicated that "forms prescribed by law"
pertained to the procedural rules, adopted by Congress, which govern federal trial
proceedings.29 Significantly, the definition of an Article III "case," for purposes of
supplemental jurisdiction, apparently relies in part for its meaning on the then
current federal procedural rules.3"
The Supreme Court later refined the concept of supplemental jurisdiction
through recognition of the ancillary and pendent jurisdiction doctrines. These
doctrines permit a federal court to hear claims that are collateral to a claim over
which the court has subject matter or diversity jurisdiction. In Fulton National
Bank v. Hozier,3' the Court stated, "the general rule is that, when a federal court has
properly acquired jurisdiction over a cause it may entertain, by intervention,
dependent or ancillary controversies .... "32
The Court recognized pendent jurisdiction in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad," which held federal courts have judicial power over a plaintiff's state law
claims, even if the court could not hear those claims independently, when the case
before the court contains a federal claim raised in good faith.34 Pendentjurisdiction
prevents the bifurcation of a plaintiff s federal and state law claims within the same
case. The utilization of one federal proceeding to decide both state and federal
claims prevents prejudice to the plaintiff by allowing the full adjudication of claims
in a federal forum.35 This mechanism also fosters a federal court's ability to decide
important questions of federal law.36
24. Id. at 823.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) ("Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those
subjects encompassed within a statutory grant ofjurisdiction.").
28. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
29. Id. at 28.
30. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case ": Procedural Rules
and the Rejection of the Gibbs Testfor Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL L.REV. 1401, 1410(1983)
(discussing the importance of federal procedural rules on the definition of an Article III case).
31. 267 U.S. 276 (1925).
32. Id. at 280.
33. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
34. Id. at 191.
35. See, e.g., Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of
Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1936 (1982) ("Without pendent jurisdiction, such
plaintiffs would probably choose to litigate their entire cases, including the congressionally favored
federal claims, in one state court action.").
36. Id.
[Vol. 56: 607
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In contrast, ancillary jurisdiction, which generally arises when a party asserts
state claims in the form of a cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
typically invokes ideas of fairness to the litigant who is before the court. For
example, without ancillary jurisdiction, a defendant would be forced to bring a state
law counterclaim against the plaintiff in a separate state court proceeding. The
Court first recognized ancillary jurisdiction in Freeman v. Howe,37 which held that
a non-diverse party could intervene in a federal action in order to state a nonfederal
claim to property held by the federal court."
In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,39 the Court imposed a factual
relatedness requirement on the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.40 Despite the
dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claim, 41 the Court held that the lower court
retained jurisdiction over defendant's nonfederal counterclaim because it arose out
of the same transaction as the subject matter of the suit.42 The effect of Moore's
liberal factual relatedness requirement is extremely significant. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, established in 1938, adopted Moore's factual relatedness
requirement, a development that spurred courts to liberalize the joinder of claims
and parties that the rules permitted where a "logical relationship" existed among the
claims.
43
The Court responded to this broad construction of jurisdictional power in the
seminal case of United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Gibbs.44 Sensing the need to
replace the pre-Rules test from Hum v. Oursler,4 the Court recognized that
"[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope
of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties, and
remedies is strongly encouraged."'  The Gibbs test requires that
[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power
in federal courts to hear the whole.47
37. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
38. Id. at 460.
39. 270 U.S. 593 (1925).
40. Id. at 610.
41. Id. at 608-09.
42. Id. at 610.
43. See Matasar, supra note 30, at 1412-13.
44. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
45. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). In its narrow holding, the Hum court stated that even though a close
factual connection existed between a plaintiff's state law and federal claim, pendent jurisdiction did
not exist when the state law claim stated a new cause of action. Id. at 246. Pendent jurisdiction was
only appropriate, the court continued, when the state law and federal claims were identical and, thus,
distinct grounds of the same cause of action. Id.
46. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
47. Id. at 725 (first emphasis added).
20051
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Notwithstanding the satisfaction of the factual requirement and the plaintiff's
expectation, a court may still, in exercising discretion, dismiss the pendent claim if
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" should
so dictate.48
Most courts view Gibbs' common nucleus test as the threshold constitutional
requirement of an Article III case or controversy for the purposes of supplemental
jurisdiction.49 The Court has expressed that ancillary jurisdiction and pendent
jurisdiction "are two species of the same generic problem: Under what
circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between
citizens of the same state?""0 Hence, both pendent and ancillary state law claims
must derive from the same common nucleus of operative facts as the plaintiffs
federal claim.
In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367"' in response to Finley v. United
States52 and what some believed to be Justice Scalia's threatening sentiments
concerning supplemental jurisdiction in the majority opinion. 3 The language of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 indicates that supplemental jurisdiction now exists for any claims
"form[ing] part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution."54 Section 1367's expansion of supplemental jurisdiction to the
outer limits of an Article III case or controversy is an implicit rejection of the
48. Id. at 726.
49. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,370-71 (1978); Cicio v. Does, 321
F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2003); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCI Metro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323
F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002);
O'Connor v. Commonwealth Gas Co., 251 F.3d 262,273 (1st Cir. 2001); Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 148 F.3d 283, 300 (3d Cir. 1998); Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 145 F.3d
660,662 (4th Cir. 1998); Edwards v. Okaloosa Cty., 5 F.3d 1431,1433 (11 th Cir. 1993); U.S. ex rel.
Olson v. W.H. Cates Constr. Co., 972 F.2d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 1992); Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of
Utah, 930 F.2d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1991); Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1989);
Espino v. Besteiro, 708 F.2d 1002, 1007 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. Owen, 437 U.S. at 370.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1990) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article I of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
Section 1367(c) follows with:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
52. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (declining to extend supplemental jurisdiction to pendent party claims).
53. See, e.g., Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: 28 US.C. §
1367,74 IND. L.J. 223,223-24 (1998) (urging a more statutory approach to supplemental jurisdiction).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
[Vol. 56: 607
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narrower same transaction or occurrence standard. However, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure distinguish permissive and compulsory counterclaims according to
the same transaction or occurrence standard.5 Because the same transaction or
occurrence standard is not dispositive of whether supplemental jurisdiction is
appropriate, a permissive counterclaim may fall within federal jurisdiction under
§ 1367. As long as the permissive counterclaim satisfies the Gibbs test and falls
within the same case or controversy as the plaintiff's claim, the Constitution does
not require any independent basis of jurisdiction.
B. The Distinction Between Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaims
The distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims arose in
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. ofAmerica v. National Electric Signaling Co.
5 6
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York stated that "a counterclaim
'arising out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit' must be
included in the answer.,17  This type of counterclaim is known today as a
compulsory counterclaim. The court reasoned that,
... as between the parties to an equity action involving the steps
to such a transaction, and the determination of rights between the
parties growing out of the transaction, all claims shall be litigated
in one suit, and that thus the matter shall be rendered res
adjudicata and future litigation avoided.5"
The court then indicated that claims not falling within the same transaction as
plaintiff's claim, like the defendant's counterclaim, were permissive and not barred
from future litigation by res judicata principles."
The court realized that Equity Rule 26 permitted a plaintiff to "join in one bill
as many causes of action cognizable in equity as he may have against the
defendant," ' yet recognized the need for a limitation, absent which a defendant
might bring endless counterclaims unrelated to the patent at issue. The court found
such a limitation in Rule 26, which stated that "[i]f it appear[s] that any such causes
of action cannot be conveniently disposed of together, the court may order separate
trials.",6' Seizing the grant of discretionary power, the court held that permissive
state law counterclaims could not be subject to litigation in the same suit if they did
not arise from the same transaction as plaintiffs claim. 62 Thus, the independent
jurisdiction doctrine for permissive counterclaims arose as a necessary limitation to
prevent burdensome litigation that would result if a defendant could assert
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
56. 206 F. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).
57. Id. at 298.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 299.
60. Id. at 300.
61. Id.
62. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Signaling Co., 206 F. 295, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).
2005]
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numerous counterclaims for any conceivable, unrelated injury suffered at the hands
of the plaintiff.
The rationale for the distinction between permissive and compulsory
counterclaims is, in the barest sense, a judicially created jurisdictional limitation
useful for several reasons. First, the rule encourages finality by placing a litigant
on notice of which claims or issues may be waived under the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, if the court does not decide the issues in the instant
action. Second, the rule delineates a line in terms of factual relatedness, beyond
which a defendant may not bring unrelated claims.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still embody this distinction. Rule 13(a)
defines a compulsory counterclaim as one that "arise[s] out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction." 3  A permissive counterclaim is "any claim against an
opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim." '64 What remains unclear, however, is an
explanation for the independent basis doctrine for permissive counterclaims.65
III. TREATMENT OF PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS
In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,66 the Supreme Court failed to address
whether supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims required an
independent basis ofjurisdiction. The Court held that jurisdiction existed over the
defendant's counterclaim since it arose out of the same transaction as plaintiffs
claim.67 Since the counterclaim was compulsory, and thus fell under the first branch
of Equity Rule 30, the Court refused to address permissive counterclaims and
whether "under the second branch, federal jurisdiction independent of the original
bill must appear."68
The Court has still not specifically addressed the independent basis doctrine or
its necessity. Yet, the Court has held that "[i]f a counterclaim is compulsory, the
federal court will have ancillary jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would
be a matter for a state court," perhaps implying that permissive counterclaims do not
fall within ancillary jurisdiction.69
Despite the lack of an explicit explanation for the independent basis doctrine,
past cases suggest potential rationales. The doctrine may have arisen as a reflection
of the then restrictive procedural rules concerning joinder of claims. These
restrictive rules are apparent in Hum v. Oursler,° in which the Court required the
joined state law claim to be factually identical to the federal claim for pendent
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
65. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 2004).
66. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
67. Id. at 609.
68. Id.
69. Jones, 358 F.3d at 210 (quoting and construing Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S.
467, 469 n.1 (1974)).
70. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
[Vol. 56: 607
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jurisdiction to arise.7 1 Another rationale is that under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13 (a), all counterclaims that are non-compulsory are perniissive; thus, the
independent basis requirement establishes some limitation to prevent federal
adjudication of numerous inappropriate counterclaims. This limitation appears
reasonable in light of the fear that supplemental jurisdiction may extend a lawsuit
beyond an Article III case or controversy.
72
A. Criticism of the Independent Basis Doctrine Predating the Enactment of
§ 1367
Many critics lambasted the independent basis doctrine well before the
enactment of § 1367. Professor Green argued that a federal court having
jurisdiction over an action should have the power to try all counterclaims filed in
the action in the interests of "trial convenience and efficiency."73 He fervently
stated that the creation of the doctrine by the Eastern District Court of New York
in Marconi was purely dictum and that later cases followed the doctrine without re-
examining its reasoning.74 "[T]he very purpose of a provision for counterclaims is
to avoid the bringing of an independent suit by defendant." 75 Therefore, "since a
counterclaim is not a new action but a continuation of the action begun by the
plaintiffs complaint, the district court should be able to entertain a counterclaim
even though it has no independent grounds of jurisdiction.
76
In a well-known concurring opinion,77 Judge Friendly rejected the notion that
permissive counterclaims require independent jurisdiction, a notion he followed in
earlier cases.7" The majority, Friendly reasoned, extended the definition of
transaction or occurrence in order to shoehorn the facts of the case into the
compulsory counterclaim category, a maneuver which could possess harsh
consequences.79 Referring to Professor Green's article,"° Friendly noted that the
permissive set-off exception,8' "requir[ing] no independent jurisdictional basis,
carries the seeds of destruction of the supposed general rule." 2
Judge Friendly's opinion is prescient when viewed in light of § 1367 and the
conclusion reached by the Jones court. The permissive set-off exception is valid
proof that the transaction or occurrence standard is a narrower concept than Article
71. Id. at 246.
72. Jones, 358 F.3d at 211.
73. Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 271,272
(1953) (construed in Jones, 358 F.3d at 211).
74. Id. at 283.
75. Id. at 274.
76. Id. at 275-76.
77. United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(cited with approval in Jones, 358 F.3d at 211).
78. Id. at 1088.
79. Id. at 1087.
80. Green, supra note 73.
81. See 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERALPRACTICE 13-31 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that set-offs "provide an exception to the rule that permissive counterclaims require an independent
basis for jurisdiction").
82. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d at 1088 (citations omitted).
2005]
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III's case or controversy. Otherwise, supplemental jurisdiction over permissive set-
off counterclaims would be beyond the limits of Article III and thus
unconstitutional. Thus, the permissive set-off exception is an example of a claim
arising outside of the same transaction or occurrence but within the same case or
controversy as the plaintiff s original claim.
Fourteen years later, the Third Circuit broke with tradition when Judge Becker
realized the inconsistencies in the treatment of permissive counterclaims and held
that jurisdiction existed over a permissive counterclaim absent independent
jurisdictional grounds.3 Refusing to recognize jurisdiction under the defensive set-
off exception, Judge Becker stated that existing ancillary and pendent jurisdictional
principles permitted such jurisdiction.84 A three-tiered analysis was necessary, he
stated, to determine if ancillary or pendent jurisdiction was permissible.85 This
analysis resembles the analysis in § 1367 but predated the statute's enactment by six
years.
8 6
The first tier requires a determination of whether constitutional power allows
the court to determine the state law claim.87 Thus, the ancillary or pendent claim
must satisfy Gibbs' common nucleus of operative fact test.88 In a break from the
majority view, Judge Becker stated that a transaction or occurrence under Rule
13(a) did not define the outer limits of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction and, in fact,
"[s]everal transactions may share an intersection of 'operative facts."' 89 This led to
the conclusion that a "determination that a counterclaim is permissive within the
meaning of Rule 13 is not dispositive of the constitutional question whether there
is federal jurisdiction over that counterclaim."9 ° Citing policy considerations, Judge
Becker asserted that to require independentjurisdiction would allow the plaintiff to
"force the defendant to try in two forums claims he would ordinarily expect to try
in one. '"' This holding represents the birth of the new breed of permissive
counterclaims, which the Second Circuit later recognized in Jones v. Ford Motor
Credit Co.,92 though without the statutory basis that the enactment of § 1367
provides.
The second tier of analysis asks "whether the exercise of jurisdiction would
violate a federal policy decision limiting federal jurisdiction," an example of which
might prevent subversion of statutory limits on federal jurisdiction.93 Significantly,
finding no relevant federal policies invalidating jurisdiction, Becker stated that
"where Congress has not spoken to the contrary or where we cannot find a
83. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1984) (cited with
approval in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2004)).
84. Id. at 988-89.
85. Id. at 989.
86. See infra Part V.B.
87. Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 989.
88. Id. at 989-90.
89. Id. at 990.
90. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 991.
92. 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
93. Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 991.
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Congressional intent to the contrary, jurisdictional statutes give federal courts the
power to exercise ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to the constitutional limit.
94
The last tier invokes the scope of the district court's discretion in exercising
jurisdiction, much like that permitted in § 1367(c). The discretionary factors for the
court to consider are "fairness to the litigants, judicial economy, and the interest of
federalism."" Becker's thoughtful contribution, embodied in the three-tier analysis,
disposed of inherent inconsistencies in the treatment of permissive counterclaims
in the Third Circuit.
B. Criticism ofthe IndependentBasis Doctrine After the Enactment of§ 1367
The enactment of§ 1367 reflected the codification of supplemental jurisdiction
by Congress. The extension of this jurisdiction to the outer limits of an Article III
case or controversy, as opposed to the traditional transaction or occurrence, is
extremely significant. As one commentator described, "[t]he Federal Courts Study
Committee, which recommended a version of § 1367 to Congress, first proposed
that supplemental jurisdiction extend to claims arising from the same 'transaction
or occurrence."' 96 Yet the House subcommittee maintained the case or controversy
language-language, the Senate noted, attributable to "substantial and helpful
comment from the academic community."97 Although no discussion of the relevant
change transpired at the hearing, "the hearing record includes a letter from
Professor Arthur Wolf suggesting the 'case or controversy' limit as a broader
alternative to 'transaction or occurrence."' 9'  Significantly, "[t]he 'case or
controversy' language suggests that supplemental jurisdiction extends to the
constitutional limit, currently defined by the Gibbs standard of a common nucleus
of operative fact."99
Thus, Congress clearly intended that the case or controversy standard would
govern supplemental jurisdiction, with the Gibbs' common nucleus test defining its
constitutional borders. This clear choice of language by Congress gives credence
to the proposition, suggested by Judge Becker and others, that the determination
that a counterclaim is permissive is not dispositive of the constitutional question of
whether a federal court has power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
Following Judge Becker's position and bolstered by the enactment of § 1367,
the Seventh Circuit summarily abolished the independent basis doctrine. In
Channell v. Citicorp National Services, Inc.,"' the court stated that "[t]he
distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims served an important
function when every assertion of pendent jurisdiction was of doubtful propriety,
because not supported by statute, but in which the law of preclusion required
94. Id. at 991 n.57.
95. Id. at 991.
96. Michael D. Conway, Narrowing the Scope ofRule 13(a), 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 148 (1993).
97. Id. at 148-49.
98. Id. at 149.
99. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 n.15 ("[S]ubsection (a) codifies the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs.")).
100. 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996) (cited with approval in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d
205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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compulsory counterclaims to be presented or lost."'' The court then held that
jurisdictional power existed over the permissive counterclaim despite the absence
of independent jurisdiction; however, the court upheld the district court's refusal to
exercise jurisdiction under the discretionary factors outlined in § 1367(c). 2
The confusion resulting from the tension between the old judicially created
ancillary jurisdiction requirements and the federal jurisdictional statutes is ever
present. In Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp.,13 the district court grappled with
a conflict concerning 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), which states that
[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district
court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters in which State law predominates. "
The provision is necessary when one defendant seeks removal and has not joined
or explained the absence of all co-defendants-a requirement under § 1441(b)."0 5
The district court reasoned that removal of the federal Truth in Lending Act claim
and two state claims by a single defendant was permissible under § 1441(c)."°
Thus, the district court held that federal supplemental jurisdiction existed over a
"separate and independent" federal claim and pendent state law claims that
necessarily fall outside of the same transaction and occurrence as the federal
claim.'0 7 Interestingly, the district court's holding implies that two claims may be
separate and independent because they do not arise under the same transaction or
occurrence, yet are within the same common nucleus of operative fact for the
purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.0 8
Courts can avoid this confusion by abandoning the transaction or occurrence
language for supplemental jurisdiction purposes, an abandonment impliedly
suggested by Congress' use of the case or controversy language in § 1367. Part V
will further explore this notion.
101. Id. at 385.
102. Id. at 387.
103. 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1990).
105. Alexander, 772 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
106. Id. at 1223.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1221.
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDEPENDENT BASIS DOCTRINE
A. The Majority of the Federal Circuits
With the exception of the Second, °9 Third,"0 and Seventh"' Circuits, the
majority of the federal circuits still adhere to the traditional independent basis
doctrine. However, § 1367 has superseded the doctrine,"' and the circuits should
follow § 1367 and exercise supplementaljurisdiction to the full extent Congress and
the Constitution allow.
Adherence to the independent basis doctrine is not only unnecessary in light of
the jurisdiction § 1367 permits, but also results in undesired consequences which
conflict with the general policy of the federal courts to dispose of all litigation at
hand in a single suit for efficiency and judicial economy. Sensing the possible
expansion of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 and the abrogation of the
distinction between permissive and compulsory for jurisdictional purposes, courts
may tend to expand compulsory counterclaims and its definition of arising from the
same transaction or occurrence to the breaking point. Labeling a claim as
compulsory allows the court to avoid the contentious issue of whether independent
jurisdiction is necessary for a permissive counterclaim after § 1367. Such a result
will lead to unequal treatment of similar facts across jurisdictions.
Even absent any distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims
for jurisdictional purposes, the distinction still remains for res judicata. Thus, a
plaintiff attempting to bring a claim falling narrowly outside of the transaction or
occurrence of a former suit, and thus labeled permissive, may find that estoppel
prevents the assertion of the claim in a later suit. This may occur when the court in
the later suit faces precedent dealing with nearly identical facts, and yet determines
that the claim was indeed compulsory. The danger arises, of course, when the cited
precedent utilizes an overbroad definition of transaction or occurrence so as to
avoid the independent basis question.
B. The Fourth Circuit's Adherence to the Independent Basis Doctrine
Fourth Circuit courts still uphold the traditional independent basis doctrine. Sue
& Sam Manufacturing Co. v. B-L-S Construction Co. " is the most common pre-§
1367 case cited for the proposition that permissive counterclaims require
independent jurisdiction. In support of its position, the court cited Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 82, "which provides that the federal rules do not 'extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts.""'4
Sue & Sam outlined the four-prong definitive test the Fourth Circuit used to
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. The first prong
considers whether the issues of fact and law that the claim and counterclaim raise
109. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
110. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1984).
111. Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996).
112. See supra Part Il.B.
113. 538 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1976).
114. Id. at 1051.
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are largely the same." 5 The second prong determines whether res judicata would
bar a subsequent suit on the defendant's counterclaim." 6 The third prong asks
whether the same evidence would support or refute the plaintiff's claim as well as
the defendant's counterclaim. 17 Finally, the fourth prong examines whether any
logical relation between the claim and counterclaim exists.'
This four-prong test is essential in determining whether the counterclaim arises
from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff s original claim. However,
since § 1367's case or controversy requirement is inherently broader than a
transaction or occurrence, the appropriateness of this four-prong test is susceptible
to criticism. Though no post-§ 1367 Fourth Circuit decisions specifically address
this issue, district courts within the circuit are divided on the appropriate standard.
For example, in Johnson v. Gala Industries, Inc.,1 9 the district court noted that
"[tlhe central issue is whether the counterclaim arose from the 'same transaction or
occurrence' as the original claim. . . . If not, then the counterclaim may be
admitted, but only if it has an independent jurisdictional basis."' 0 Significantly, the
court noted that the statutory terminology is now same case or controversy under
§1367, but that the "semantic differences [between 'case or controversy' and
'transaction or occurrence'] do not alter the analytical mechanics."'' The court
then applied the Sue & Sam four-prong test.'22 By applying the four-prong test, the
court presumes that the analysis and scope under § 1367's same case or controversy
language is identical to that of the same transaction or occurrence under the old
ancillary model. This presumption is a mistake because the analysis of same case
or controversy may or may not rely on the same considerations.2 3 Though the
analysis may be appropriate to determine whether a compulsory counterclaim exists
for res judicata or estoppel purposes, the courts should not use the test to distinguish
counterclaims for jurisdictional purposes.
One Fourth Circuit case contains language implying that § 1367 necessitates
the same four-prong test for determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. In Shanaghan v. Cahill,"4 the court stated that "supplemental
jurisdiction [under § 1367] also incorporates the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction."'2 5 This determination presupposes that Congress' choice of expanded
language embodied in case or controversy does not alter the analysis and its relevant
factors for the purposes of determining jurisdiction.
Thus, confusion within the Fourth Circuit concerns whether § 1367 supplants
or incorporates case law treatment of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. The
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1052.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1053.
119. No. 95-1031-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9893 (W.D. Va. June 7, 1996).
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id. at *3 n.l.
122. Id. at *4-5. See also Harrison v. Grass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 (D. Md. 2004) (utilizing
the four-prong test in Sue & Sam to determine if counterclaim is permissive or compulsory and
requiring permissive counterclaims to possess an independent basis for jurisdiction).
123. See infra Part V.
124. 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
125. Id. at 109n.1.
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incorporation of ancillary jurisdiction analysis for counterclaims is of limited use,
however, given the expansion of supplemental jurisdiction to the outer limits of
Article III. As the Jones court states, the determination of whether a counterclaim
is permissive or compulsory is not determinative of the constitutional question of
whether supplemental jurisdiction exists. 26 After § 1367, the determination that a
counterclaim is permissive is only relcvant for purposes of res judicata or estoppel,
though the factors considered under the four-prong test may offer reasonable
guidelines to determine whether jurisdiction exists.
V. THE LITIGATION UNIT UNDER § 1367's "CASE OR CONTROVERSY"
If the determination that a counterclaim is permissive and arises outside the
transaction or occurrence is not determinative of whether supplemental jurisdiction
exists, as the Jones court states,'27 then how does one determine if the counterclaim
arises in the same case or controversy? As Professor Green has stated, the real issue
is determining what the correct litigation unit is for jurisdictional purposes. 2 Due
to the enactment of § 1367 and its use of the broader case or controversy language,
this question is more relevant now than ever. Does § 1367 incorporate the Gibbs
constitutional definition of a case or controversy? Is the Gibbs standard a
constitutional definition at all? Whether or not the Gibbs test applies, what factors
must courts consider to determine the reasonable litigation unit for supplemental
jurisdictional purposes after § 1367?
A. The Gibbs Test and § 1367
Even before the enactment of § 1367, commentators suggested that Gibbs'
factual relatedness requirement does not in fact determine the outer limits of an
Article III case or controversy.'29 Professor Matasar posited that the factual
relatedness requirement should be viewed as a statutory, not constitutional,
requirement for supplemental jurisdiction. 3 He provided six examples in which
supplemental jurisdiction over factually unrelated claims is
permissible-jurisdiction that is unconstitutional if factual relatedness is indeed a
constitutional requirement after Gibbs. 3' These six examples are cases involving
claims to property, receivership actions, aggregation of factually unrelated claims
to meet the amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases, bankruptcy
jurisdiction, attorney's fees dispute cases, and, most notably, set-off cases.
32
Considering these exceptions to the Gibbs principle, Professor Matasar stated, "one
is converted back to the old time religion--supplemental jurisdiction may be
126. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ambromovage
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984)).
127. Id.
128. Green, supra note 73, at 293.
129. See supra Part I.A.
130. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1448.
131. Id. at 1463.
132. Id. at 1463-77.
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exercised when the federal and nonfederal claims are part of one constitutional
'case' or 'controversy."" 33
According to Matasar, case or controversy harkens back to the "forms
prescribed by law," which is a reference to the rules of procedure Congress
established-the modem day Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'34 He stated that the
power to assert supplemental jurisdiction "is capable of acting only when the
subject is submitted to it, by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed
by law. It then becomes a case .... ,"'5 The Gibbs "ordinarily be expected to try"
test'36 also bolsters this interpretation.'37 If the Federal Rules permit a particular
breed of joinder, a party would ordinarily expect to try the joined claim in the
instant case. Thus, one factor in defining a litigation unit is determining what is
permissive under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in terms ofjoinder of claims
or parties. Since the Rules do not state that permissive counterclaims require
independent jurisdiction, the independent basis doctrine need not apply.
Professor Fletcher also asserted that the Gibbs common nucleus test should not
apply to all forms of supplemental jurisdiction.13 First, he stated, the Supreme
Court has not decided whether the Gibbs test applies to all types of supplemental
jurisdiction, though it has encountered the issue in three seminal cases.' 3 Second,
as a matter of historical interpretation, adjudication of factually unrelated claims,
including defensive set-offs, has been permitted both in English and American
courts."' Finally, as a matter of current practice and usage, under the modem
Federal Rules, factually unrelated claims "are allowed, even encouraged, as part of
the same litigation." 41
As a matter of practicality, however, courts should utilize the Gibbs common
nucleus and ordinarily expected to try tests in determining whether a permissive
claim falls within the same case or controversy as the plaintiff's claim, at least until
the Supreme Court devises another standard to define case or controversy. Despite
inherent inconsistencies, the common nucleus test still provides a reliable standard
for the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.
133. Id. at 1478.
134. Id. at 1479-80.
135. Id. at 1479 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818
(1824)).
136. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1463. For a discussion of the possible interpretations of the"ordinarily be expected to try" language in Gibbs, see id. at 1454-58. Professor Matasar argued that
courts should read the ordinarily be expected to try test and the common nucleus of the operative facts
test together. Id. at 1458. The full scope of the test and its interplay with the "common nucleus of
operative facts" test is beyond the scope of this Article.
137. Id. at 1463.
138. William A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact"and Defensive Set-Off: Beyond
the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1998).
139. Id. at 176 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)).
140. Id. at 177.
141. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) ("A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against
an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim."); FED. R. Civ. P. 18 ("A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims,
as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.").
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The utilization of the Gibbs test also permits the conclusion that some
permissive counterclaims, though arising outside a transaction or occurrence, fall
within the same case or controversy as the plaintiffs claim. Illustrating such a
flexibility in terms of factual relatedness, both courts and commentators have "given
the phrase several different interpretations, ranging from those requiring near
identity between the facts.., to those requiring only a loose 'logical relationship'
between the claims.
142
This flexibility is evident in Jones, where the court found the permissive
counterclaim to fall within the same case or controversy as plaintiffs claim.143 The
court determined that both the plaintiffs discrimination claim under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and defendant's state law debt collection counterclaims
"originate[d] from the Plaintiffs' decisions to purchase Ford cars."' 4 This factual
relationship, the court stated, at least satisfied the Gibbs common nucleus standard,
though the court expressed uncertainty that the "Gibbs ... standard provide[s] the
outer limit of an Article III 'case"' under § 1367.
4
1
Interestingly, the Jones court stated the Gibbs test "was developed to provide
some limit upon the state law claims that a plaintiff could join with its federal law
claims."' 46 Yet, "[t]hat rationale does not necessarily apply to a defendant's
counterclaims," because "[t]here is no corresponding risk that a defendant will
decline to file in state court an available state law claim, hoping to be lucky enough
to be sued by his adversary on a federal claim so that he can assert a state law
counterclaim.'
' 47
Jones exemplifies the appropriate analysis courts should undertake to determine
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim under
§ 1367. However, in a recent case within the Fourth Circuit, Johnson v. Gala
Industries, Inc., the court incorrectly utilized the Sue & Sam four-prong test to
establish that the counterclaim was permissive and then dismissed it for lack of
independent jurisdiction. 4"
Section 1367 sets out the correct standard, which the Johnson court erroneously
equated to the four-prong test. '49 Though conceding that the witnesses would be the
same for both the claim and counterclaim, the court rested its decision on a lack of
evidentiary similarity. 50 In revealing language, the court stated that "[w]hile it is
often true that absent the circumstances giving rise to the original claim, the actions
creating the counterclaim never would have occurred, equally often there are
fundamental evidentiary differences between the claim and counterclaim."' 51 The
circumstances from which the claim and counterclaim arose in this case were the
plaintiffs employment with defendant and subsequent alleged discriminatory
142. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1448.
143. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 2004).
144. Id.
145. Id. at213-14.
146. Id. at 214 n.7.
147. Id.
148. Johnson v. Gala Indus., Inc., No. 95-1031-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9893, at *4-5 (W.D.
Va. June 7, 1996). For a full discussion of the Sue & Sam four-prong test see supra Part IV.B.
149. Id. at *3 n.l.
150. Id. at *6-7.
151. id. at *6.
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discharge.5 2 The defendant's counterclaims consisted of slander per se and breach
of fiduciary duty."3
Had the Johnson court utilized the correct analysis under § 1367, as the Jones
court did, a strong argument would have existed that the circumstances of the
employee's discharge, out of which both claim and counterclaims derived,
established a sufficient common nucleus of operative fact to constitute a case or
controversy for § 1367 purposes. Recall that the Jones court, following the correct
analysis, found that the plaintiff's decision to purchase cars from defendant satisfied
the same case or controversy standard." 4 However, the result in Johnson is less
important than the means the court utilized to attain the result. The court used the
four-prong analysis to determine whether both the claim and the counterclaim
derived from the same transaction or occurrence,' the incorrect standard for §
1367 purposes.
B. The Correct Analysis for Permissive Counterclaims Under § 1367
The first step in considering whether federal power exists to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim is to determine whether
the claim and counterclaim derive from the same case or controversy, as defined in
Gibbs, under § 1367. Summary dismissal of the permissive counterclaim for lack
of independent jurisdiction is no longer a valid option, though this antiquated
standard is still exercised by most federal courts today, including those within the
Fourth Circuit."5 6 The permissive counterclaim may still derive from the same case
or controversy as the plaintiff's claim, like the counterclaim in Jones.
5 7
A case or controversy is present when both the claim and counterclaim arise
from a common nucleus of operative fact and the litigant would ordinarily be
expected to try his claim or counterclaim in the same proceeding. Though varying
definitions abound for a common nucleus of operative fact, given the liberal joinder
of claims and parties that the modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit and
the shift in language away from same transaction or occurrence in § 1367, at least
a logical relationship should exist between the claim and permissive counterclaim.
One commentator noted that those who assert that more than a logical
relationship should be necessary in the interests of judicial economy rest their
assertion on two erroneous assumptions: first, "that no saving is made by trying
loosely related claims together in one action; second, that the constitutional power
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction exists for the sole purpose of judicial
economy.' 5 8 In fact, "supplemental jurisdiction rests on far broader concerns:
preserving the integrity ofthe federal jurisdiction, granting those with federal claims
152. Id. at*1.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 2004).
155. Johnson v. Gala Indus., Inc., No. 95-1031 -R, 1996 U.S. District LEXIS 9893, at *3-5 (W.D.
Va. June 7, 1995).
156. See supra Part IV.
157. Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2004).
158. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1454.
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unimpeded access to a federal forum, and giving courts the flexibility to resolve
whole 'cases' in appropriate circumstances."' 9
After a determination that the claim and permissive counterclaim constitute one
case or controversy, the court must then consider whether any of the four
circumstances under § 1367(c) "are present to an extent that would warrant the
exercise of discretion to decline assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.' 60 When
"at least one of the subsection 1367(c) factors is applicable, a district court should
not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless it also determines that doing
so would not promote the values articulated in Gibbs: economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.'
' 6'
VI. CONCLUSION
The evolution of supplemental jurisdiction is long and complex. Yet, the
enactment of § 1367 should leave no question in the minds of courts that
determining that a counterclaim is permissive is not dispositive to the constitutional
question of whether the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction exists over the
counterclaim. A permissive counterclaim may still maintain a logical relationship
to the plaintiff's claim, such that both, taken together, constitute one case or
controversy, satisfying the constitutional requirements of the Gibbs test and the
statutory requirement of § 1367.
The ancillary and pendent principles, which have developed over the years,
necessarily reflect the then current judicial concerns and forms of proceeding.
Supplemental jurisdictional principles are not static, however, but evolve in
response to the increasing efficiency of the judicial system and to those concerns
expressed by the people through Congress. Much is to gain in a judicial system in
which it is in the court's discretion to determine all matters and claims in one
proceeding, when appropriate and within constitutional bounds. Consequently,
federal courts should endeavor to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent the
Constitution and Congress permit.
Full access by our citizens to a federal forum is also a prerequisite to an
efficient and fair judicial system. This concern is of particular importance when
that citizen is a defendant who is brought before a federal court and who deserves
the full opportunity to assert a counterclaim against the plaintiff. Section 1367
provides the citizen this opportunity, and the courts should reassess the jurisdiction
this statute permits. Such a reassessment should lead the courts to the conclusion
that permissive counterclaims may indeed fall within the same case or controversy
as plaintiff's claim.
Courts possess a discretionary grant of power to dismiss permissive
counterclaims when necessary. The considerations in § 1367(c) outline that
discretion, and those considerations are the mechanism through which Congress
has expressly limited the courts to dismiss or remand a claim or counterclaim.
M. Evan Lacke
159. Id.
160. Jones, 358 F.3d at 214.
161. Id. (citation omitted).
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